Tuesday, October 28, 2014

Configuring IPsec VPNs

My previous post discussed the concepts of IPsec VPNs. This post focuses on the actual implementation.

The following scenario is used to demonstrate the configuration.


This type of setup is referred to as a site-to-site IPsec VPN or LAN-to-LAN (L2L) IPsec VPN.

I'm using two Cisco ASA 5505 firewalls with ASA 8.4 (ASA01) and 8.2 (ASA02) software versions. Because of this, the commands are going to be slightly different on each device. Cisco 1841 router is emulating the Internet cloud.

The Configuration

Essentially, the configuration consists of two parts: defining the IKE Phase 1 and IKE Phase 2 specific negotiation parameters for IKE/ISAKMP SA and IPsec SA, respectively. The IKE SA parameters are advertised inside an IKE/ISAKMP policy. The policy includes the following definitions:
  • encryption algorithm
  • authentication type
  • hashing method
  • Diffie-Hellman group
  • (optional) lifetime of seconds or kilobytes (86400 seconds by default)

The IPsec SA parameters are configured inside a crypto map. The crypto map contains the following information:
  • peer details (Who is the tunnel endpoint?)
  • proxy IDs (What traffic is encrypted?)
  • transform-set (How is the traffic encrypted?)

So let's look at the configuration step by step.


0. Verify IP connectivity.
Before an administrator can even consider configuring an IPsec VPN tunnel, there must be full IP reachability. Without going into the details, below is a briefing of a working configuration.

--- ASA01 ---

interface Vlan1
 nameif inside
 security-level 100
 ip address 10.1.1.1 255.255.255.0
!
interface Vlan2
 nameif outside
 security-level 0
 ip address 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.0

!
object network obj_any
 subnet 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0
 nat (inside,outside) dynamic interface
!
route outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.0.2.254

--- ASA02 ---

interface Vlan1
 nameif inside
 security-level 100
 ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0
!
interface Vlan2
 nameif outside
 security-level 0
 ip address 198.51.100.1 255.255.255.0

!
global (outside) 1 interface
nat (inside) 1 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0

!
route outside 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 198.51.100.254

ASA01# ping 198.51.100.1
Type escape sequence to abort.
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 198.51.100.1, timeout is 2 seconds:
!!!!!
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max = 1/1/1 ms


Hurray for successful pings!


1. Define the IKE/ISAKMP policy.
ASA01#
crypto ikev1 policy 10
 authentication pre-share
 encryption aes
 hash sha
 group 2
 lifetime 86400


ASA02#
crypto isakmp policy 15
 authentication pre-share
 encryption aes
 hash sha
 group 2
 lifetime 86400


Note that the policy number is only locally significant, and does not have match between the peers. A device can have more than one policy configured, and they are sequentially processed. The number signifies the priority, or the preference order (1 highest, 65535 lowest).

Another observation, I did not enter the command lifetime 86400 under the policy configuration. The ASA automatically added it as a default value.


2. Enable IKE/ISAKMP on the interface. 
ASA01#
crypto ikev1 enable outside

ASA02#
isakmp enable outside


3. Configure the transform-set. 
ASA01#
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES192-MD5 esp-aes-192 esp-md5-hmac

ASA02#
crypto ipsec transform-set TRANSET esp-aes-192 esp-md5-hmac

I like to choose a descriptive name for the transform-set that, in itself, indicates the encryption and hashing methods used.


4. Set the proxy IDs.
The ACLs define the "interesting traffic", which is to be encrypted. The proxy IDs must be mirrored between the peers (the name is locally significant).

ASA01#
access-list L2L extended permit ip 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0

ASA02#
access-list VPN-TRAFFIC extended permit ip 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0


5. Combine everything in the crypto map.
ASA01#
crypto map DEMOVPN 10 match address L2L
crypto map DEMOVPN 10 set peer 198.51.100.1
crypto map DEMOVPN 10 set ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES192-MD5


ASA02#
crypto map VPN-CRYPTOMAP 10 match address VPN-TRAFFIC
crypto map VPN-CRYPTOMAP 10 set peer 192.0.2.1
crypto map VPN-CRYPTOMAP 10 set transform-set TRANSET


Again, the names are locally significant, but they must refer to the correct components on that device. 


6. Configure tunnel-groups.
ASA uses tunnel-groups to set values for VPN connections. Tunnel-groups contain a small number of attributes that pertain to creating the tunnel itself. Tunnel-groups are a concept to simplify system management.

ASA01#
tunnel-group 198.51.100.1 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 198.51.100.1 ipsec-attributes
 ikev1 pre-shared-key Sw0rdOfAzer0th


ASA02#
tunnel-group 192.0.2.1 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 192.0.2.1 ipsec-attributes
 pre-shared-key Sw0rdOfAzer0th



7. Apply the crypto map on the interface.
ASA01#
crypto map DEMOVPN interface outside

ASA02#
crypto map VPN-CRYPTOMAP interface outside


8. NAT exemption.
As a final step, the traffic between the LANs must be exempted from NAT translation. According to the order of operations, NAT occurs before any crypto operations. Hence, if the NAT exemption rule is not created, the IP addresses are translated, and will not match the crypto map, never triggering the encryption process.


ASA01#
object network INSIDE-NET
 subnet 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0
object network L2L-VPN-NET
 subnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
!
nat (inside,outside) source static INSIDE-NET INSIDE-NET destination static L2L-VPN-NET L2L-VPN-NET


ASA02#
nat (inside) 0 access-list VPN-TRAFFIC


** Full Configuration **

ASA01#
crypto ikev1 policy 10
 authentication pre-share
 encryption aes
 hash sha
 group 2
 lifetime 86400
!
crypto ikev1 enable outside
!
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES192-MD5 esp-aes-192 esp-md5-hmac
!
access-list L2L extended permit ip 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
!
crypto map DEMOVPN 10 match address L2L
crypto map DEMOVPN 10 set peer 198.51.100.1
crypto map DEMOVPN 10 set ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES192-MD5
!
crypto map DEMOVPN interface outside
!
tunnel-group 198.51.100.1 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 198.51.100.1 ipsec-attributes
 ikev1 pre-shared-key Sw0rdOfAzer0th
!
!
!
object network INSIDE-NET
 subnet 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0
object network L2L-VPN-NET
 subnet 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
!
nat (inside,outside) source static INSIDE-NET INSIDE-NET destination static L2L-VPN-NET L2L-VPN-NET



ASA02#
crypto isakmp policy 15
 authentication pre-share
 encryption aes
 hash sha
 group 2
 lifetime 86400
!
isakmp enable outside
!
access-list VPN-TRAFFIC extended permit ip 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0
!
crypto ipsec transform-set TRANSET esp-aes-192 esp-md5-hmac
crypto ipsec security-association lifetime seconds 28800
crypto ipsec security-association lifetime kilobytes 4608000
!
crypto map VPN-CRYPTOMAP 10 match address VPN-TRAFFIC
crypto map VPN-CRYPTOMAP 10 set peer 192.0.2.1
crypto map VPN-CRYPTOMAP 10 set transform-set TRANSET
!
crypto map VPN-CRYPTOMAP interface outside
!
tunnel-group 192.0.2.1 type ipsec-l2l
tunnel-group 192.0.2.1 ipsec-attributes
 pre-shared-key Sw0rdOfAzer0th
!
!
!
global (outside) 1 interface
nat (inside) 1 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
!
nat (inside) 0 access-list VPN-TRAFFIC



Verification

Let's look at show and debug command output to verify that the tunnels have successfully established. Note that these are noisy commands, and could overwhelm the device, if used incorrectly. I would recommend forwarding the output into the logging buffer, instead of the console.

The debug crypto ikev1/isakmp and debug crypto ipsec output tells us that both Phase 1 and Phase 2 completed successfully, and inbound/outbound IPsec SAs were created. Pay special attention to the SPIs (the hexadecimal numbers). SPI stands for Security Parameter Index, and it is used to identify different traffic streams that may use different encryption rules and algorithms.

%ASA-7-713906: IP = 198.51.100.1, Connection landed on tunnel_group 198.51.100.1
%ASA-7-713906: Group = 198.51.100.1, IP = 198.51.100.1, Generating keys for Initiator...
%ASA-5-713119: Group = 198.51.100.1, IP = 198.51.100.1, PHASE 1 COMPLETED
%ASA-5-713120: Group = 198.51.100.1, IP = 198.51.100.1, PHASE 2 COMPLETED (msgid=9e76630b)
%ASA-6-602303: IPSEC: An outbound LAN-to-LAN SA (SPI= 0x66B29CF6) between 192.0.2.1 and 198.51.100.1 (user= 198.51.100.1) has been created.
%ASA-6-602303: IPSEC: An inbound LAN-to-LAN SA (SPI= 0x4FB207F5) between 192.0.2.1 and 198.51.100.1 (user= 198.51.100.1) has been created.
%ASA-5-752016: IKEv1 was successful at setting up a tunnel.  Map Tag = DEMOVPN. Map Sequence Number = 10.



The crypto ikev1/isakmp sa command provides brief information about the current IKE SAs.

ASA01# show crypto ikev1 sa

IKEv1 SAs:

   Active SA: 1
    Rekey SA: 0 (A tunnel will report 1 Active and 1 Rekey SA during rekey)
Total IKE SA: 1

1   IKE Peer: 198.51.100.1
    Type    : L2L             Role    : initiator
    Rekey   : no              State   : MM_ACTIVE



ASA02# show crypto isakmp sa

   Active SA: 1
    Rekey SA: 0 (A tunnel will report 1 Active and 1 Rekey SA during rekey)
Total IKE SA: 1

1   IKE Peer: 192.0.2.1
    Type    : L2L             Role    : responder
    Rekey   : no              State   : MM_ACTIVE



The show crypto ipsec sa command displays detailed information about the current IPsec SAs status. The output shows that on ASA01 only 4 packets encapsulated/0 packets decapsulated, and vice versa on ASA02. Why? This is because I actually have a PC only in the 10.1.1.0/24 network (the other side is an empty LAN). However, pinging any IP address in the 192.168.1.0/24 network still triggers the encryption process, and the packets are routed normally towards the assumed destination. But there will be no reply from non-existent devices.

ASA01# show crypto ipsec sa
interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: DEMOVPN, seq num: 10, local addr: 192.0.2.1

      access-list L2L extended permit ip 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (10.1.1.0/255.255.255.0/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (192.168.1.0/255.255.255.0/0/0)
      current_peer: 198.51.100.1

      #pkts encaps: 4, #pkts encrypt: 4, #pkts digest: 4
      #pkts decaps: 0, #pkts decrypt: 0, #pkts verify: 0
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 4, #pkts comp failed: 0, #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 192.0.2.1/0, remote crypto endpt.: 198.51.100.1/0
      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 66B29CF6
      current inbound spi : 4FB207F5

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x4FB207F5 (1337067509)
         transform: esp-aes-192 esp-md5-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 24576, crypto-map: DEMOVPN
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (3915000/28060)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x00000001
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x66B29CF6 (1722981622)
         transform: esp-aes-192 esp-md5-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 24576, crypto-map: DEMOVPN
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (3915000/28060)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x00000001



ASA02# show crypto ipsec sa
interface: outside
    Crypto map tag: VPN-CRYPTOMAP, seq num: 10, local addr: 198.51.100.1

      access-list VPN-TRAFFIC extended permit ip 192.168.1.0 255.255.255.0 10.1.1.0 255.255.255.0
      local ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (192.168.1.0/255.255.255.0/0/0)
      remote ident (addr/mask/prot/port): (10.1.1.0/255.255.255.0/0/0)
      current_peer: 192.0.2.1

      #pkts encaps: 0, #pkts encrypt: 0, #pkts digest: 0
      #pkts decaps: 4, #pkts decrypt: 4, #pkts verify: 4
      #pkts compressed: 0, #pkts decompressed: 0
      #pkts not compressed: 0, #pkts comp failed: 0, #pkts decomp failed: 0
      #pre-frag successes: 0, #pre-frag failures: 0, #fragments created: 0
      #PMTUs sent: 0, #PMTUs rcvd: 0, #decapsulated frgs needing reassembly: 0
      #send errors: 0, #recv errors: 0

      local crypto endpt.: 198.51.100.1, remote crypto endpt.: 192.0.2.1

      path mtu 1500, ipsec overhead 74, media mtu 1500
      current outbound spi: 4FB207F5
      current inbound spi : 66B29CF6

    inbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x66B29CF6 (1722981622)
         transform: esp-aes-192 esp-md5-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 24576, crypto-map: VPN-CRYPTOMAP
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4374000/28025)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x00000001
    outbound esp sas:
      spi: 0x4FB207F5 (1337067509)
         transform: esp-aes-192 esp-md5-hmac no compression
         in use settings ={L2L, Tunnel, }
         slot: 0, conn_id: 24576, crypto-map: VPN-CRYPTOMAP
         sa timing: remaining key lifetime (kB/sec): (4374000/28025)
         IV size: 16 bytes
         replay detection support: Y
         Anti replay bitmap:
          0x00000000 0x00000001


That's a lot to chew. I know. Write your questions in the comments section.





Thursday, October 23, 2014

Under The Magnifying Glass: IPsec VPN

Taking a short detour from STP, I'm devoting a few posts for IPsec VPNs. I had to do IPsec VPN troubleshooting for a customer, and since the topic is included in the CCIE Routing and Switching blueprint, I figured it would be a good time to refresh my memory on the subject. So hang on tight, the posts are going to be long..

Overview

The term VPN, which stands for Virtual Private Network, is a broad category for providing private connectivity between devices operating over a shared infrastructure (like VLANs, MPLS, or GRE tunnels). However, it does not directly imply encryption and security. This is what IPsec is for. IPsec implements cryptographic protocols, and provides three basic benefits:
  • authentication: using pre-shared keys or digital certificates to verify the source
  • confidentiality: encrypting data before transmission, and hence, preventing data from being captured
  • integrity: ensuring that data has not been tampered with by an attacker

In short, deploying an IPsec VPN is a cost-effective method to secure data transmission over insecure shared media. IPsec VPN tunnels are typically implemented, when a growing organization expands to multiple locations, and secure connectivity is required between the sites. 

Negotiating The Tunnel

Before two peers can establish a secure communications tunnel, they must negotiate a number of parameters. This negotiation process consists of two phases: IKE Phase 1 and IKE Phase 2. Phase 1 sets up a bidirectional control/management tunnel by mutually authenticating peers, negotiating cryptographic parameters, and creating session keys.  The Phase 1 tunnel, also referred to as IKE/ISAKMP SA, has only one purpose: to securely carry out the negotiation for the IPsec tunnels, which are established in Phase 2. Phase 2 is entirely dependent on the completion of Phase 1.  Phase 2 builds two one-way IPsec tunnels (IPsec SAs), which are used for actual user data transmission.  

IKE Phase 1

The following attributes are negotiated in IKE Phase 1 to establish the IKE SA (Security Association):
  • encryption algorithm: a symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the traffic (DES, 3DES, AES)
  • authentication method: the procedure to verify the identity of the peer (pre-shared keys or PKI)
  • hashing algorithm: a mechanism to produce a checksum that allows peers to detect if data has been modified during transit (MD5, SHA)
  • Diffie-Hellman group: a process that enables peers to securely exchange a shared secret, which is then used by the symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt data; Diffie-Hellman group determines the strength of the key used by the process (DH-1, DH-2, DH-5 etc.) 

The aforementioned attributes are mandatory, and must be explicitly defined in a security policy (also called an ISAKMP policy). In addition, a lifetime for the SA is specified either as a function of seconds or bits transmitted (the peers agree on the lower value). Multiple security policies can be configured. 

The IKE SA negotiation can be performed in one of two modes: main mode or aggressive mode.
The following describes, how Main mode uses three pairs of messages to negotiate the IKE SA (added sanitized packet captures):

1. The initiator sends its configured security policies to the responder. They are sequentially evaluated until a policy, which contains parameters that both peers agree on, is found.

a. Message #1 from the Initiator.
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.0.1 (10.0.0.1), Dst: 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: isakmp (500), Dst Port: isakmp (500)
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
  Initiator SPI: cf02326f14a95b93
  Responder SPI: 0000000000000000
Exchange type: Identity Protection (Main Mode) (2)
Type Payload: Security Association (1)
Type Payload: Transform (3) # 1
  Transform ID: KEY_IKE (1)
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=1,l=2) Encryption-Algorithm : AES-CBC
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=14,l=2) Key-Length : 128 
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=2,l=2) Hash-Algorithm : SHA
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=4,l=2) Group-Description : Default 768-bit MODP group
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=3,l=2) Authentication-Method : PSK
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=11,l=2) Life-Type : Seconds
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=12,l=4) Life-Duration : 86400

b. Message number #2 from the Responder.
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2), Dst: 10.0.0.1 (10.0.0.1)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: isakmp (500), Dst Port: isakmp (500)
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
  Initiator SPI: cf02326f14a95b93
  Responder SPI: 18a109f89219e8df
Exchange type: Identity Protection (Main Mode) (2)
Type Payload: Security Association (1)
Type Payload: Transform (3) # 1
  Transform ID: KEY_IKE (1)
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=1,l=2) Encryption-Algorithm : AES-CBC
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=14,l=2) Key-Length : 128
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=2,l=2) Hash-Algorithm : SHA
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=4,l=2) Group-Description : Default 768-bit MODP group
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=3,l=2) Authentication-Method : PSK
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=11,l=2) Life-Type : Seconds
  Transform IKE Attribute Type (t=12,l=4) Life-Duration : 86400

2. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange to establish a “shared secret” is performed. 

The Diffie-Hellman key exchange allows both peers to independently produce the same key for encrypting and decrypting data. I will not go into the details of the underlying cryptographic algorithm, which involves large prime numbers, but below is a simplified illustration of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange concept.


In simplicity, the idea is to agree to use a common prime number, then “mix” it with a secret integer, and send the product to the peer. The peer will then add its own secret integer into the product, which results in an identical key that is computationally difficult, if not impossible, for modern computers to reverse in a reasonable amount of time. The peers have jointly established a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel.

a. Message #3 from the Initiator.
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.0.1 (10.0.0.1), Dst: 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: isakmp (500), Dst Port: isakmp (500)
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
  Initiator SPI: cf02326f14a95b93
  Responder SPI: 18a109f89219e8df
Type Payload: Key Exchange (4)
  Next payload: Nonce (10)
  Key Exchange Data: 3bce03faae189d2b151a4d527d6122a23b87fb1344d4084b...
Type Payload: Nonce (10)
  Nonce DATA: 6ea7c7ed3ca3383538801b4b32a5aba161807765

b. Message #4 from the Responder.
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2), Dst: 10.0.0.1 (10.0.0.1)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: isakmp (500), Dst Port: isakmp (500)
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
Initiator SPI: cf02326f14a95b93
Responder SPI: 18a109f89219e8df
Type Payload: Key Exchange (4)
  Next payload: Nonce (10)
  Key Exchange Data: babc863ab198bd0c0c94a5c79eb31579948fcdc79cb31656...
Type Payload: Nonce (10)
  Nonce DATA: 781a7f836ed8f1231b779d24ca0a366cad029684

3. The session is authenticated. The peers validate their identities by using pre-shared keys or digital certificates. At this point, the communication is encrypted.

a. Message #5 from the Initiator.
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.0.1 (10.0.0.1), Dst: 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: isakmp (500), Dst Port: isakmp (500)
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
  Initiator SPI: cf02326f14a95b93
  Responder SPI: 18a109f89219e8df
Next payload: Identification (5)
Exchange type: Identity Protection (Main Mode) (2)
Encrypted Data (80 bytes)

b. Message #6 from the Responder.
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.0.0.2 (10.0.0.2), Dst: 10.0.0.1 (10.0.0.1)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: isakmp (500), Dst Port: isakmp (500)
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
  Initiator SPI: cf02326f14a95b93
  Responder SPI: 18a109f89219e8df
Next payload: Identification (5)
Exchange type: Identity Protection (Main Mode) (2)
Encrypted Data (48 bytes)

The graph below is a visual representation of the IKE Phase 1 Main Mode. 

Contrary to the six messages (three pairs) exchanged in Main Mode, Aggressive Mode uses only three messages. The same information is still exchanged between the peers, but the process is abbreviated to the following steps:

 
1. The initiator sends ISAKMP policies, Diffie-Hellman details, and identity information to the responder. The first packet is basically equivalent to the first four packets in Main Mode.
2. The responder authenticates the packet and sends back its key material, and an identification hash.
3. The initiator verifies the identity of the responder from the hash. If it matches, Phase 1 is completed and IKE SA is established.
 
NOTE: when using Aggressive Mode, the authentication information is exchanged between peers unencrypted. This means that if an attacker is able to catch Phase 1 messages, the identification information can be gathered, providing an opportunity to exploit systems. 

IKE Phase 2

After IKE Phase 1 has successfully completed, the peers move on to IKE Phase 2, whose purpose is to establish the actual IPsec connection that will be used to securely forward application data later. Unlike the bidirectional IKE SA, the IPsec SAs are unidirectional. The IPsec SAs are created through Quick Mode. The communication consists of three messages, and is encrypted by the algorithm specified in the IKE SA.

By default, the shared secret exchanged in IKE SA negotiation is also used for the IPsec SAs. However, during Quick Mode, the peers may enable Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), which causes a new shared secret to be created through another Diffie-Hellman key exchange for each IPsec SA. PFS adds overhead, but it also provides greater security. 

The following steps briefly describe the operation of Quick Mode:

1. The initiator sends its transform-sets to the responder. The associated information includes the encryption algorithm, the hash algorithm for integrity checking, the tunnel encapsulation type (ESP or AH), the tunnel mode (tunnel or transport), the proxy IDs to define “interesting traffic”, and Diffie-Hellman group if PFS is used. 


2. The responder exams the proxy IDs, and compares them to the proxy IDs defined on itself. The proxy IDs must match (mirrored) or a failure occurs. The responder returns the acceptable transform-set to the initiator.



3. The last message of the negotiation operates as a type of keepalive verification mechanism, which has two purposes: 1) to verify that the initiator received and processed the message that the responder sent in the in the previous step, and 2) to avoid DoS replay attacks on the responder by resending the first messages (the negotiation is tracked by a message ID).  


After the last message is received, all negotiations have concluded, and the peers are ready to exchange encrypted traffic. Finally, one bidirectional IKE SA and unidirectional IPsec SAs (inbound and outbound) will have formed.



Modes of Operation

As briefly mentioned earlier, there are two modes of operation: Tunnel Mode and Transport Mode. The essential difference is that Transport Mode protects only the data contained in the IP packet payload (the original source and destination information is retained), whereas Tunnel Mode protects the entire IP datagram by adding a new IP header (containing the IP addresses of the VPN gateways).  

Security Protocols

There are two security protocols, which define the encapsulation type of IPsec traffic: ESP (Encapsulation Security Payload) and AH (Authentication Header). AH provides only integrity checking and origin authenticity. In addition to these features, ESP also provides confidentiality (encryption). Because of the lack of encryption in AH, ESP is often preferred. 

The graph below depicts the packet structure of AH and ESP in Transport Mode and Tunnel Mode, respectively.


“Interesting Traffic”

The proxy IDs, which are exchanged in IKE Phase 2, refer to the “interesting traffic” that triggers the whole process of negotiating the IKE/IPsec SAs and defines what type of traffic is encrypted. As an example, the proxy ID will contain the following information:

  • local proxy ID (source): 10.1.1.0/24
  • remote proxy ID (destination): 192.168.1.0/24
  • service: any 
The configured proxy IDs (mirrored) must match between the peers for IKE Phase 2 to complete successfully. Reflecting on the previous example, the peer must have the following configuration:

  • local proxy ID (source): 192.168.1.0/24
  • remote proxy ID (destination): 10.1.1.0/24
  • service: any